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This volume of essays has its origin in a chance conversation in 1993 in which it 
emerged that no event had been organised to mark the five hundredth anniversary of 
the forfeiture of the Lordship of the Isles by King James IV of Scotland.  The result 
was a small academic conference the following year based at Ballygrant on Islay, 
close to the former symbolic centre of the Lordship at Finlaggan, and plans to bring 
the papers from that conference together as a published collection.  That plan never 
matured and the conference papers which represented the contribution of different 
disciplines to the study of the MacDonald Lordship mainly found homes in academic 
journals or were incorporated into larger research publications.  Individually, none 
came close to offering the chronological breadth or disciplinary breadth that the multi-
author collection had promised and, while in the last two decades there has been a 
renaissance of research into the Late Medieval period in the Western Highlands and 
Islands of Scotland – focussed especially on the Church – a comprehensive modern 
overview of the MacDonald lordship in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries has 
remained a conspicuous absentee on the publications horizon. 
    The essays in this volume, amongst which are two substantially revised and 
developed papers from that original 1994 conference, are not claimed to constitute 
such a comprehensive overview; they focus on key themes that illustrate the culture(s) 
and identity/ identities of the territories encompassed by the MacDonald Lordship at 
its peak, from portable personal artefacts to ships, buildings and the visual signifiers 
of heraldry; episodes critical in the development, downfall and disintegration of the 
MacDonalds’ imperium; and institutions that gave form and substance to MacDonald 
power.  None are ‘traditional’, indeed some might be regarded as iconoclastic in the 
challenges that they present to conventional understanding of issues such as the 
MacDonalds’ relations with the Bruce family in Scotland and the Lancastrian kings in 
England, or the feudal/military lens through which castle-building and the projection 
of lordship in the West Highlands and Islands have long been viewed.  By breaking 
through the constraining framework of prejudices and preconceptions that are the 
legacy of nineteenth-century historiography, these essays offer a new set of 
perspectives on the complex of land, sea, people, material expressions and mental 
imaginings that together constituted the political embodiment of the medieval Scottish 
Gaidhealtachd. 
 
But what was that embodiment of the medieval Scottish Gaidhealtachd?  There is 
perhaps a tendency to view it as territorially monolithic, a single entity that spanned 
the whole of the Hebrides and much of the West Highland mainland, united under a 
sole ruler and sharing common linguistic and material cultural norms.  A key aim in 
assembling this collection of essays has been to take a fresh look at that vision of 
unitary identity free from the expressions of ‘manifest destiny’ that coloured much 
nineteenth-century writing that revolved around Clan Donald and the claims voiced 
on its behalf by generations of Gaelic sennachaidhs and clan historians to a role as 
rightful leaders of the Gael.  These claims ‘established’ the MacDonalds’ descent 
extending back to the apical figure of Somerled/Somairle, and then founded on a 
concocted royal pedigree equal to that of the kings of Scots from him to the ninth-
century Irish warrior Gofraidh, son of Fearghus, who was described anachronistically 
in the seventeenth-century Annals of the Four Masters as ‘chief of the Innsi Gall’ at 
the time of his death.
1
  In re-evaluating that traditional vision, many of the 
contributors have confronted a series of the pillars upon which several of the 
established perceptions of the MacDonalds’ place within the wider frame of Scottish 
history have been constructed.  Questioning the teleological determinism and 
Whiggish perspectives of much nineteenth- and earlier twentieth-century 
historiography, they have raised challenging questions over the traditional projection 
of the Lordship as a ‘state-within-a-state’ competing with Lowland Scotland’s 
anglophone political community for primacy, threatening both the territorial integrity 
and independent existence of the kingdom, and whose rulers’ prestige and power 
rivalled the authority of the kings of Scots.  Beyond this political historical 
recontextualisation, however, these studies have also explored aspects of the social 
and cultural behaviour of the MacDonalds, questioning the traditional presentation of 
the relationship with the east and south of the mainland in terms of socio-cultural 
polar opposites and revealing instead the interconnectedness and hybridity of what 
has long been depicted as distinct blocs.  Sharp cleavages there certainly were 
between the predominantly Gaelic- and predominantly English-speaking districts, but 
there were equally sharp distinctions within those blocs and areas where cultural 
interfaces were blurred. 
    Regardless of the antiquity-forging (in every sense of that term) intentions of 
generations of Clan Donald poets, genealogists and the more recent scholars who 
have accepted their claims, there remains one inescapable fact: for nearly two 
centuries, the Western Highlands and Islands of Scotland were dominated by one 
family, the MacDonalds of Islay.  Descended from the great twelfth-century warlord 
Somerled/Somairle, they had long contended with their kinsmen the MacDougalls and 
the MacRuairis for the headship of their extended kin-network and the lordship of the 
Hebrides and Argyll which that brought.  Long overshadowed by both of those rival 
families, it was in the turmoil of the Wars of Independence that the MacDonalds 
found the opportunity to achieve superiority and in the political upheavals of 
fourteenth-century Scotland were given the circumstances to consolidate their 
position of dominance and create an enduring territorial lordship in the West.  Whilst 
they could trace their ancestry to the mid-1100s, in most of the surviving early post-
medieval MacDonald family histories celebrating and emphasising that lineage at 
least as much stress was placed on the significance of John MacDonald, the head of 
the kin for most of the fourteenth century, who moved his family from the margins 
into the political mainstream of the kingdom.  For more modern writers John held an 
added significance; it was in his Latin charters that the title dominus Insularum (Lord 
of the Isles) appears first to have been deployed, resulting in his labelling as 1
st
 Lord 
of the Isles.  Although the totemic status of this Latin title is now played down in most 
scholarly analysis, which points instead to its origin simply in the translation of the 
Gaelic style rí Innse Gall (King of the Islands of the Strangers) used of Hebridean 
rulers from the eleventh century,
2
 it has remained a convenient device for justifying 
the arbitrary dividing-line between the twelfth- and thirteenth-century Kingdom of the 
Isles and a fourteenth- and fifteenth-century Lordship.  Artificial though the division 
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is, it has been adopted in this volume as the chronological frame within which the 
focus of the contributing scholars has fallen. 
    The Lordship of the Isles: to academic and non-academic audiences alike the name 
is laden equally with historical and romantic associations that are the products of the 
complex and often contradictory constructions of Scottish identity-making that 
appeared in literary and antiquarian circles in the early nineteenth century.  As a 
modern historiographical tradition evolved, that mix of romance and history has 
elicited often extreme responses amongst historians, most writing with a Lowland 
Scottish perspective that was distinctly antipathetic to Highland and Hebridean culture 
yet at the same time was curiously attracted to the ‘otherness’ to their own cultural 
experience that it represented.  For some the Lordship was a warning from history, an 
exemplar of everything that was wrong with alternatives to mainstream anglophone 
Scottish/British culture, and to be held up as a mirror to the positive achievements of 
that with which it collided and against which it ultimately failed.  Alternative 
evocations of the shattering ruination of a once-united and stable Highlands and 
Islands at the close of the fifteenth century in the aftermath of the Lowland 
government’s dismemberment of the Lordship may be a distortion of historical 
realities, but proponents of this vision were surely right to emphasise the ‘importance 
and […] potentialities’ of simply the idea of ‘the last principality of Gaelic Alba’.  For 
them the appeal of the Lordship was as much in its ‘might have beens’ as in the very 
real achievements in the arts, music and literature that were fostered by its existence.
 3
  
But their celebration of the Lordship’s unique contribution to the diversity and 
richness of medieval Scotland highlighted just that sense of difference and 
detachment that their opponents viewed as dangerous and threatening to the project 
that was the making of the medieval Scottish kingdom.  The result has been an 
historiography of immense complexity and often extreme polarity, where the conflicts 
of five centuries past have been refought with venom and vitriol surpassing the 
bitterness of the original struggles, and where even attempted objectivity could be 
construed as a carefully contrived slight.  This present study seeks to navigate a 
course through these paper conflicts to explore the diverse historiographical strands 
and examine their collective contributions to the formation of current academic views 
on the place of the Lordship of the Isles within the context of medieval Scotland. 
    This overview of the modern historiography of the Lordship of the Isles takes as its 
starting-point Patrick Fraser Tytler’s History of Scotland, published in stages from 
1828 to 1843.
4
  Tytler’s method, which was grounded in his training as a lawyer, saw 
the exposure of his historical sources to rigorous and sceptical analysis, and saw the 
completion of an intellectual shift that had begun in the mid eighteenth century from 
an historiographical tradition where interpretation was based on modern assumptions 
coloured by the authors’ personal prejudices to one where interpretation was instead 
founded on the evidence of contemporary witnesses.  Although still deeply coloured 
by Tytler’s own political Toryism, his exploration of the triumph of Scotland’s laws 
and legal institutions despite the descent into social violence, foreign and civil warfare 
accompanied by a collapse in the authority of central government, became established 
as the foundation upon which most later-nineteenth-century Scottish academic writing 
on history was raised.
5
  Tytler fixed a series of key themes as the central and defining 
characteristics within Scotland’s historical experience into his narrative, cementing 
them into place as veritable articles of faith in the historical canon that was developed 
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from his work.  Many of these themes arose from post-Union Scottish legal-
philosophical perspectives on the constitution, most notably his strongly Tory views 
on what constituted good and strong government, on the cultural rectitude of Lowland 
values, and on the conflicts between private ambition and public responsibility – often 
expressed in terms of unjust means of achieving just ends – all given sharper relief by 
the unconscious reflex of his own cultural prejudices.  Further nuance was added by 
his conviction that there had existed an impulse in pre-Union Scotland towards the 
kinds of liberty represented by the modern British constitution, but that that impulse 
had been thwarted by the disorder that had flowed from English attempts to conquer 
Scotland and Scottish resistance to those attempts. 
    Several of these strands combined in Tytler’s treatment of the place of the Lordship 
within the medieval kingdom.  In his reading of the late medieval chronicle discussion 
of a distinction between Highland and Lowland cultures, such as that which had been 
brought to recent scholarly attention through Walter Goodall’s 1769 edition of the 
narrative attributed to John of Fordun,
6
 and from parliamentary records of legislation 
directed against certain manifestations of Highlanders’ social behaviour, he saw the 
historical roots of the Highland-Lowland antagonism that had been brought to its 
bloody climax almost within living memory at the battle of Culloden and in its 
aftermath.  From this perception of ancient enmity between opposed cultures he 
constructed the first detailed ‘modern’ treatment of the notion of a racial division in 
medieval Scotland between Gaels and Saxons/Teutons or Highlanders and 
Lowlanders.
7
 Despite his extended analysis of what he perceived to be the racial or 
cultural composition of the kingdom there was little in his historical narrative that 
threw any light on the emergence of the political institutions of the Highlands and 
Islands, and the Lordship rather falteringly emerged as a topic in his discussion of 
David II’s reign.8  From the outset, his discussion was constructed to support his 
gradualist view of the development of liberty under the British constitution, a regime 
which afforded the greatest degree of personal freedom to its citizens and under which 
the liberty of the state was a direct reflection of the morals of its people.  The 
Lordship provided him with a perfect model to explore that linkage between degrees 
of liberty and good government and the moral qualities of the people: it is clear from 
Tytler’s language that he regarded the Gaelic constituent of the medieval realm as 
inferior in that regard to the Lowland one, and that it thus posed a dangerous threat to 
the vision of a stable, united realm that was being advanced by the progressive, 
Lowlands-based monarchy. 
    Volume three of Tytler’s work saw the political and cultural threat that the 
Lordship posed to Lowland Scotland and royal government explored in detail, 
commencing with discussion of the events surrounding the battle of Harlaw in 1411.
9
  
Setting the tone that coloured most subsequent analyses of early Stewart Scotland 
until the 1990s, Tytler depicted Harlaw as an outcome of the chronic failure of royal 
government which he saw as characterising the period 1371 to 1424.  In this he 
followed the presentation of that period as illustrated by ‘Fordun’ and his fifteenth-
century continuator, Walter Bower, as a time of disorder, where the strong preyed on 
the weak and where violence was deployed casually as a political instrument.  A 
straightforward reading of both the contemporary parliamentary record and the 
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narrative chronicle accounts appeared to support his perception; descriptions of 
violent disorder, failures to exercise justice, moral decadence and corruption, and of 
the debilitating internecine feuding and political machinations of the kingdom’s social 
leadership abound.
10
  Tytler saw all of these elements coming together in a dispute 
over possession of the earldom of Ross which triggered the military collision at 
Harlaw.  In that dispute, Donald of the Isles resorted to military aggression to secure 
possession and, in Tytler’s eyes, underscore his superiority of right and power through 
carrying destruction into the heartland of the Scottish political establishment.  It was, 
however, not just a policy of mindless violence, for Tytler used newly accessible 
documentary records to discuss Donald’s diplomatic dealings with the English crown, 
and the threat which an alliance between him and Henry IV of England posed for the 
Scots.
11
  Here, then, his views on both the disruptive impact of English efforts to 
impose their overlordship on Scotland and on the moral weakness of the Gael were 
combined to powerful effect. 
    Whilst Tytler’s analysis succeeded in maintaining a balanced view of the justice of 
Donald’s claims but the injustice of his actions, there emerged in it a clearly-stated 
belief in an ‘old and deep-rooted hostility between the Celtic and Saxon race.’12  The 
size, ferocity and exoticism of Donald’s army featured prominently in his discussion 
set in contrast to the cultural normality and numerical inferiority of the Lowlanders 
who mustered to march against him.  A subtle manifestation of these themes had been 
present since the sixteenth century in Lowland historiography but from Tytler 
onwards description of the contrasts shifted from supposed cultural polar opposites to 
one which presented that opposition in terms of mutually visceral hatred arising from 
race or ethnicity.  A sense of cultural ‘otherness’ and of the threat posed by the 
Highlanders to settled Lowland society continued through much of the rest of Tytler’s 
discussion,
13
 but the place of the Lordship within his grand narrative of Scottish 
historical, political and constitutional development remains marginal until the actions 
of its rulers impinged upon the political life of the kingdom more generally.   
    It is in respect of John 4
th
 Lord that Tytler’s focus fixed on the Lordship, 
commencing with John’s involvement with the Earls of Douglas in the period 1452-5, 
but becoming most expansive in the context of the treaty negotiated in 1462 by John 
and his kinsman, Donald Balloch, with Edward IV of England, and its aftermath in 
1475-6.
14
  Throughout, the chief protagonist in these events is John, that ‘fierce and 
insurgent noble,’ who is presented as the principal disturber of Highland Scotland and 
a notoriously recalcitrant rebel.  In his account of the end of John’s rule in 1493, 
Tytler constructed the narrative that became generally accepted through subsequent 
historical analyses for the next century: the young James IV recognising that the 
tyrannical regime of the Highland chiefs formed the greatest obstacle to the 
introduction of good government to the region determined to impose royal authority 
over them and curb their powers.
15
  In what followed, John became the architect of his 
own downfall, having ‘the folly to defy the royal vengeance’ and ‘this formidable 
rebel’ was rewarded with the consequent loss of his lands and possessions.  It is, in 
essence, a moral tale that Tytler presents, of ambition, arrogance and ingratitude 
rewarded by justly-deserved total and irrecoverable loss of titles, lands and, more 
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tragically, family, but it is coloured throughout by the implication that John’s – and 
his predecessors’ – actions were characteristic of the culture from which they sprang.  
For the good of the whole realm on its progress towards constitutional perfection as a 
partner in the modern British state, but particularly for the poor unfortunates who 
languished under MacDonald misrule, the Lordship had to go. 
    Tytler brought down the curtain on the Lordship of the Isles with the forfeiture of 
1493, offering no discussion of the consequences of the king’s actions and how actual 
government was exercised in the absence of the central figure of the Lord.  Those 
were themes dealt with in depth for the first time by Donald Gregory, Secretary of the 
Society of Antiquaries of Scotland, whose1836 History of the Western Highlands 
tackled the turbulent era of political reconstruction in the region from 1493 to 1625.
16
  
To provide context for the post-1493 position, Gregory constructed an historical 
narrative for the period 80-1493, the fourteenth- and fifteenth-century sections of 
which were based heavily on Tytler but with significant input of ideas from Gregory’s 
friends, colleagues and fellow-Antiquarians Cosmo Innes and William F Skene.  
Gregory, as a member also of the Iona Club and Ossianic Society of Glasgow, and as 
his close friendship with William Skene would suggest, was altogether more 
Celtophilic than Tytler.  As a consequence, his work lacks much of the cultural 
prejudice that pervaded Tytler’s History and provides a more nuanced view of the 
place of the medieval Gaidhealtachd within Scotland.  One particularly significant 
departure from Tytler’s standpoint was Gregory’s emphasis on the place of the 
MacDonalds vis à vis Scottish magnate politics and the integration of West Highland 
lords into the Scottish political community.  His discussion of the rise of the 
MacDonald Lordship from the time of Angus Óg into the career of his son, John 1
st
 
Lord, revolves around the close personal relationship of the former with King Robert I 
and the collapse of that relationship through the latter’s (non-)relationship with David 
II and frequent collisions with magnate rivals.
17
  There is, too, an emphasis on John’s 
rebelliousness as being a response to Scottish royal policies rather than it being 
simply an expression of his ambitions for independence; his intrigues with England, 
however, were in Gregory’s eyes still unequivocally treasonable.18  Government 
failures to deal justly with the grievances of John’s son and grandson, the weakness 
and partisanship of the rule of the Albany Stewarts, and their failure to manage the 
often conflicting demands of the MacDonalds and their kinsmen added to the 
estrangement of the Lords of the Isles from the Scottish political community. 
    For Gregory, the proof of this view of Highland disturbance arising from Lowland 
government mismanagement was to be seen in Alexander 3
rd
 Lord’s later good 
relationship with James I, his loyalty arising from due appreciation of ‘the lenity 
shown to him by a prince celebrated for the unbending rigour of his government.’19  
The departure from this more positive view of MacDonald/Stewart relations comes 
with John, 4
th
 Lord, but even here his political machinations were interpreted by 
Gregory in the wider context of crown-magnate relations in mid-fifteenth-century 
Scotland, with John being enmeshed with and obliged to his political associates the 
Douglases.  In that regard, Gregory had no dispute with Tytler’s view that John was 
the architect of his own downfall in 1475/6, but he is altogether more ambivalent with 
respect to post-1476 events.  Rather than continuing to be the schemer and active 
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disturber of the peace that Tytler presented him as, Gregory saw John as a passive 
bystander in events driven by more aggressive members of his family.
20
  Indeed, in 
his final judgement of John in the context of the 1493 forfeiture, Gregory for the first 
time floated the suggestion that perhaps his ‘chief crime’ was his ‘inability to keep the 
wild tribes of the West Highlands and Islands in proper subjection’ rather than his 
rebelliousness.
21
  Disregarding the dubiousness of any claim that all that was needed 
to keep the region in check was firm government, this otherwise was a perceptive 
observation but it was over a century before it won more widespread acceptance as a 
factor behind James IV’s suppression of the Lordship. 
    The significance of Gregory’s History lay in its use of primary historical records to 
provide its supporting evidence rather than resorting to the mainly late sixteenth- and 
seventeenth-century clan histories upon which most earlier discussions had been 
based.  In this approach he followed Tytler and, as a consequence, his work has had 
enduring significance as the first modern historical analysis of the MacDonalds.  It 
meant, too, that his work was heavily mined by the writers of a host of later 
nineteenth-century clan histories, typified by Alexander Mackenzie’s 1881 History of 
the MacDonalds and Lords of the Isles.
22
  Narrative in format and hugely derivative 
of other historians’ work, Mackenzie’s greatest contribution to the evolving 
historiography was his observations on the difficulty that any MacDonald seemed to 
have in writing an unbiased history of the family and its chieftains.
23
  Although this 
comment was pointed principally at the seventeenth-century clan historians who had 
written very much from the perspective of their own segment of the MacDonalds’ 
notions of where the headship of the by then fragmented kin rightfully lay and who 
clearly manipulated the historical evidence to suit their case, Mackenzie also very 
much had the contemporary MacDonald historians firmly in his sights.  Although 
roundly criticised by those same historians, there is value in Mackenzie’s efforts to 
draw together the various strands which comprised MacDonald historiography by the 
last quarter of the nineteenth century and reconcile it with the mainstream Lowland 
historiography that had burgeoned since Tytler’s day.  The result, however, is to 
modern eyes a bizarre series of quoted extracts from the principal authorities strung 
together with a commentary by Mackenzie that in places is clearly struggling to 
construct a coherent narrative from seemingly contradictory sources.  It was, 
nevertheless, a generally positive view of the Lordship, albeit one that saw its proper 
historical context as being the wider history of the medieval kingdom rather than as an 
independent entity. 
    Amongst the most formidable of Mackenzie’s critics were the Reverends Angus 
and Archibald MacDonald, whose three-volume study The Clan Donald was 
published between 1896 and 1904.
24
  Their work remains the most comprehensive 
history of the clan and its various branches.  Volume one was devoted to the rise of 
the family from the time of Somerled and traces its history through the senior line 
down to the death of Donald Dubh in 1545, bracketed by an introductory overview 
chapter outlining the pre-twelfth-century history of the Isles and two concluding 
chapters outlining the social history of the insular Gaidhealtachd and the ecclesiastical 
history of the area.  Like Gregory, it was founded on exhaustive documentary 
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analysis, volumes two and three drawing together much previously unpublished 
material from the archives of the various cadet lines of the clan.  But herein lies one of 
its chief weaknesses, very much as Mackenzie had earlier warned; it is a partisan 
study, produced by and for MacDonalds and with a decidedly positive view of the 
contribution of the MacDonald Lords of the Isles to Scotland’s history.  In the 
MacDonalds’ analysis, for example, the Highlands under the rule of Alexander 3rd 
Lord of the Isles and his son, John 4
th
 Lord, was a haven of tranquillity in comparison 
to the faction-ridden south of the kingdom,
25
 an assessment which neatly sidesteps the 
strife-torn early years of Alexander’s lordship and sits ill at ease with the extensive 
accounts of plundering raids which they provide at length in their discussion.  This 
stance was also a reaction against the traditionally unsympathetic portrayal of the 
Highlands in mainly Lowland-focussed histories, their interpretation – as discussed 
below – becoming if anything yet more negative as the nineteenth century progressed.  
The result was a conscious turning of what Tytler had presented as Gaelic cultural 
vices into virtues, exemplified in the apology offered for Donald Balloch’s role in the 
1462 treaty negotiations with Edward IV of England, where it was his ‘Celtic spirit, 
keen, restless, and eager,’ that led him to throw his energies into the scheme.26  
Although the MacDonalds’ highly positive interpretation of events might have won 
favour with an increasingly Celtophilic element in Scottish academic and antiquarian 
circles – symbolised in the establishment of a Chair of Celtic at the University of 
Edinburgh in 1882 – it nevertheless stood in stark variance to the deeply-entrenched 
traditional Scottish historical canon.  While their analysis of the documentary 
evidence and the transcriptions that they provided would win their work respect 
amongst academic historians, their stridently pro-MacDonald and Highland stance 
failed to secure broader recognition in the Scottish historical mainstream. 
    Despite Gregory and the MacDonalds’ efforts, throughout the nineteenth century 
mainstream historical writing continued to define the relationship between the Lords 
of the Isles and the Scottish crown in terms of Tytler’s struggle to the death between 
incompatibly opposed racial groups within a single nation.  An extreme view of such 
cultural and racial collision was expressed in John Hill Burton’s account of the 
MacDonald/Stewart confrontation at Harlaw, which he saw as the ‘final struggle for 
supremacy between the Highlands and the Lowlands.’ 27  He viewed these regions as 
having diverged irretrievably in terms of core values by the fourteenth century, with 
Lowland Scottish culture achieving unquestionable superiority at all levels over that 
of the Highlands. He dismissed any suggestion that Harlaw should be regarded as an 
episode in a civil conflict between parties who under other circumstances would have 
lived and worked in harmony; such partnership was not ‘within their range of rational 
expectations.’28  He claimed further that in Lowland Scotland Harlaw: 
was felt as a more memorable deliverance even than that of Bannockburn. 
What it was to be subject to England the country knew and disliked; to be 
subdued by their savage enemies of the mountains opened to them sources 
of terror of unknown character and extent.
29
   
His presentation of Highland-Lowland relations is charged with the language of 
ancient and implacable animosity, mutual hatred and irresolvable conflict based on 
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racially-determined cultural opposites: industrious and diligent Lowland 
agriculturalists and burghers against idle, indolent and predatory Highlanders.  This 
view ran counter to late Victorian Celtophilism in Scotland, especially following the 
Queen’s express admiration of Highland culture since the late 1840s.  It does, 
however, reflect the ambivalence displayed towards Gaelic culture more generally in 
late nineteenth-century Britain, where one segment of society’s public expressions of 
conscience over the treatment of Highlanders since 1746 and more especially in 
respect of the Highland Clearances were matched by another’s certainty in the moral 
and cultural degeneracy of the Gaels. 
    Hill Burton’s stridently anti-Highland tone is at one historiographical extreme and 
few academic historians shared similar views. Racial difference, however, remained 
prominent in historical discussion of Lowland/Highland conflict.  In his 1899 History 
of Scotland, Peter Hume Brown, the first Professor of Scottish History at the 
University of Edinburgh, shared Hill Burton’s racial/cultural views.  Again with 
reference to Harlaw’s significance, he claimed that it ‘...ranks with the battle of 
Carham (1018) in its determining influence on the development of the Scottish nation 
[...] never since that day has Teutonic Scotland been in real danger from the Celtic 
race to whom it owed its being.’30 Hume Brown’s statement was made in the context 
of his discussion of the ‘making of Scotland’ and his view of the transformation of the 
nation from one where Scottish culture and society was predominantly Celtic in 
character to one where Lowland, English-speaking culture was regarded as 
characteristically Scottish.  In his assessment, it was the ultimate triumph of Lowland 
over Highland culture that determined the whole future development of Scotland as a 
progressive, industrious nation, setting it on the path to eventual partnership with 
England. 
    Within the late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Lowland Scottish historical 
tradition the affairs of the Lordship were problematical in that they ran contrary to the 
grand narratives of state-building and identity-shaping which were central to that 
tradition.  The habit of writers such as Hill Burton and Hume Brown of referring to 
the Lowland districts and their populations as Scotland/Scots and the Highlands and 
Islands as Celtic reinforced an idea of separation that positioned the northern and 
western parts of mainland Scotland and the Isles as at best marginal and at worst 
external to the medieval kingdom and its people.  This trend reached its fullest 
expression in Andrew Lang’s somewhat confused and often contradictory discussion 
of the relationship of the Lordship of the Isles with the rest of the kingdom.  His 
account consisted of isolated vignettes thrown into a grand narrative that took the 
south-eastern Lowland experience as being representative of all of Scotland.  Lang 
acknowledged his debt to Hume Brown in the preface to his work, and, while he 
disagreed with his ‘overrated’ description of Harlaw as ‘a strife for Celtic or Lowland 
supremacy in the north,’31 his down-playing of the significance of the battle was his 
only deviation from Hume Brown’s wider thesis of a cultural clash.  Lang’s general 
treatment of Highland-Lowland relations hinges on a deep-seated racial antipathy that 
he believed was already in evidence in the twelfth century.  In his stridently Whiggish 
view of Scotland’s long march towards unity, stability and prosperity, the ‘Celts’ were 
incorrigible troublemakers whose actions on occasion threatened the security and 
indeed the existence of the kingdom, and whose behaviour required troublesome 
digressions from his chronological narrative of the events that truly made Scotland.
32
  
                                                 
30
 P Hume Brown, History of Scotland, i, (Cambridge, 1899), 167. 
31
 A Lang, A History of Scotland, 5
th
 edition, vol 1 (Edinburgh, 1929), 292. 
32
 Lang, History of Scotland, vol 1, 372. 
Lang’s use of language compounds the negative tone of his account: the alignment of 
John MacDonald with Edward Balliol in the 1330s, for example, was described as a 
purchasing of support from the ‘“auld enemies of Scotland” the children of Somerled, 
the Celts of the West and the Isles.’33  His labelling of the Clan Sorley leadership in 
this matter as inveterate foes of the Scots is a generalisation that rests uncomfortably 
with both his earlier account of the adherence of Clan Donald to the Bruce cause, and 
his subsequent comments on the relationship between the same John and the 
Steward.
34
 
    The most extreme manifestation of Lang’s conflict over how to interpret Highland-
Lowland relations in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries emerged in his account of 
the Harlaw campaign. In a convoluted passage where he claimed on the one hand that 
‘the Celts, as a whole, were nothing less than sturdy maintainers of Scottish 
independence’ but on the other ‘recognised no common part in Lowland patriotism,’ 
Lang ended by decrying the events of 1411 as proof ‘that Scotland could be stabbed 
[…] from behind, by the Celtic pensioner of England.’35  Indeed, he further speculated 
that Donald 2
nd
 Lord’s negotiations with Henry IV were intended to secure English 
military assistance for his adventure.  In the end, despite an oddly Celtophilic strand 
in his work,
36
 Lang identified with the Lowland ‘Scots’ and their supposed perception 
of the Highland ‘Celts’ as an enemy within.  Like Hume Brown and Hill Burton 
before him, Lang presented this episode as a climactic event in a long-evolving 
conflict between racial or cultural groups who shared little common identity beyond 
their subjection to the same king.  Indeed, the cultural gulf between the Highlanders 
and Lowlanders was deemed sufficient explanation for the tendency of the former to 
ally with the English against the latter, just as the Scots allied with the French.  It was 
not, Lang explains, a matter of patriotism or any lack thereof; for the Celt, his own 
interests were paramount.
37
  As with most accounts of the breakdown in Stewart-
MacDonald relations, the final tipping-point in the breach came with the dispute over 
Ross.  Regardless of the rights and wrongs in this issue, Lang laid stress on Donald’s 
status as a pensioner of the English crown at this time and, with remarkable 
overstatement, claimed that to admit his right to Ross would have placed practically 
the whole of the North of Scotland in the hands of this unpredictable Celt.  Not only 
was racial or cultural difference being raised as a critical dimension of the breach – 
although Lang is more tempered than most of his predecessors in his presentation of 
events - but the relationship of the greatest Celtic magnate with the king of England 
was being trailed by him as constituting a grave danger to the integrity or survival of 
the Scottish realm.
38
 
    After the high drama of 1411, the Lordship vanished from Lang’s nation-building 
narrative to re-emerge fleetingly in his discussion of the personal rule of James I.  
There, after a passing reference to the alignment of Alexander 3
rd
 Lord’s interests 
with those of the king in the destruction of the Albany Stewarts, the central themes are 
of Highland disorder juxtaposed with royal duplicity in the further undermining of 
Crown-MacDonald relations.
39
  Alexander’s son, John, received a similar cameo 
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appearance in the narrative of internecine magnate feuding in the minority of James 
II, introduced as protector of James Livingstone after his fall from grace and, without 
explanation, in possession of the royal castle at Urquhart on Loch Ness-side.
40
  The 
seventeen-year-old John’s seizure of Urquhart and Ruthven in Badenoch, and burning 
of Inverness – dismissed as an ‘escapade’ – and his cousin Donald Balloch’s 
devastating raids on the Clyde coast are again simply presented as illustrations of the 
threat posed by Clan Donald to the kingdom’s security and stability, but little 
rationale is offered for those events.  The theme of treachery on the part of the Clan 
Donald leadership, however, re-emerges explicitly in Lang’s discussion of Anglo-
Scottish relations during the minority of James III.  Then, in a return to the imagery 
employed in respect of the Harlaw conflict, John MacDonald’s league with Edward 
IV of England was labelled as an opportunity to ‘stab Scotland in the back with a 
Celtic dirk.’41 
    Throughout Lang’s forays into Highland and Hebridean affairs it was John 
MacDonald who was the guiding hand behind Clan Donald’s political and diplomatic 
manoeuvres; he was the ‘Celtic wolf’ who lorded it over the ‘Lowland sheep’.42  This 
view of John 4
th
 Lord as the driving-force in Clan Donald policy or as the dominant 
power even within the territories over which he was nominally lord is not one that 
accords well with more recent assessments,
43
 nor does it sit comfortably with Lang’s 
own wider discussion of Highland affairs.  In his commentary on the downfall of the 
lordship from 1475 onwards he owed much to Gregory; while John remained central 
to the narrative he was presented as a pathetic figure, genuinely penitent and contrite, 
but whose efforts to reach a lasting settlement with the king were frustrated by his 
inability to control either his son or his other MacDonald kinsmen.
44
  The final 
forfeiture of John and suppression of the lordship in 1493 merited a mere three 
sentences, while the aftermath was explained in simple terms of royal skill in James 
IV’s adroit manipulation of rivalries within both Clan Donald and between the clans 
who sought to benefit from the elimination of their former overlord.
45
  There were 
serious challenges ahead, but Lang’s view was that James IV had settled the Highland 
problem ‘as far as it ever was settled till after Culloden.’46  Henceforward, the 
region’s history could be treated simply as a side-event in the Scottish grand narrative. 
    While Hume Brown, Lang and their followers carried the Victorian 
historiographical tradition of a clash of two culturally-opposed races into the 
twentieth century, a divergent thesis had already emerged with the 1911 publication 
by R S Rait of the first modern academic articulation of an alternative interpretation.
47
  
Without naming Hill Burton, Rait explicitly rejected his view of the collision between 
MacDonald Lords and Stewart kings as being fundamentally racial and cultural in 
origin and pointed to the neutral accounts of fifteenth- and sixteenth-century sources.  
His down-playing of the race or culture dimension and emphasis instead on the 
dynastic politics that drove MacDonald-Stewart relations was endorsed 
enthusiastically in the 1930s by W C Mackenzie, who famously presented the most 
prominent example of those dynastic politics – Harlaw - as ‘...really a family 
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squabble, all the parties being related by blood or marriage.’48 That statement was 
later attacked as a trivialising of the significance of the battle,
49
 but his critic missed a 
central point in Rait’s and Mackenzie’s discussions: the cultural hybridity of the 
leading combatants and the closeness of the political and familial links between the 
leadership on both sides. 
    Rait and his followers, however, failed to displace Hume Brown from his dominant 
position, principally through the pre-eminent place as the ‘standard’ work that Hume 
Brown’s History held in Scottish schools and universities.  That pre-eminence was 
only countered effectively for the first time in the early 1960s when William Croft 
Dickinson, a successor to Hume Brown in the Scottish History chair at Edinburgh, 
produced a new overview of the kingdom’s evolution to 1603.50 In a brief analysis all-
too-often overlooked in more recent discussions, Croft Dickinson discounted 
explanations that followed a racial or cultural line and like Mackenzie stressed instead 
the cultural hybridity of the senior members of both the Stewarts and the 
MacDonalds.
51
  This approach was exemplified by his discussion of Donald 2
nd
 
Lord’s Stewart blood and status as a grandson of King Robert II, while in the case of 
Alexander Stewart, earl of Mar, he was one of the first modern scholars to attach 
significance to the earl’s Gaelic credentials and former status as a leader of caterans.  
Although individual components of Croft Dickinson’s thesis have been challenged 
more recently, it is essentially his vision of Highland/Lowland oppositions as a 
protracted struggle for economic resources and political dominance amongst the 
Scottish ruling elite that still frames most modern discussion. 
    By the 1960s, the historiographical trend towards a narrative predicated upon a 
vision that equated ‘national’ history with the history of the dominant socio-economic 
and political zones of the kingdom had become established as the mainstream 
tradition.  The ‘making of the kingdom’ theme that had run through Scottish historical 
writing since the early nineteenth century increasingly adopted a perspective where 
the Scottish crown and its most responsive agents were presented as positive forces 
struggling to build a stable state in the face of rebellious provinces and over-ambitious 
magnates with pretensions to independence.  The extension of Scottish royal authority 
across mainland Scotland in the twelfth and thirteenth centuries was discussed in 
terms of a regaining of rights that had been lost in the face of the Scandinavian 
irruption of the ninth to eleventh centuries or the elimination of dynastic rivals who 
had usurped the rightful powers of the men calling themselves kings of Scots.  That 
restoration of royal authority was viewed as having reached its natural and logical 
limits under Alexander III, in whose reign the last portions of the supposed ancestral 
homeland of his dynasty in Argyll and the Isles was reintegrated into the kingdom.  
Despite recognition of how recent the assertion of Scottish lordship over the western 
Highlands and Hebrides was and how shallowly-rooted any notion of a distinctly 
Scottish identity for themselves was on the part of the Islesmen, the subsequent 
history of the region was being constructed in the new narrative histories from a 
firmly Lowland and monarchocentric perspective.  The history of the Lordship of the 
Isles especially was viewed from within the bubble of this national historiography as 
part of that sub-set labelled as later medieval crown-magnate relations. 
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    One of the most influential manifestations of this trend appeared in J D Mackie’s 
single-volume A History of Scotland, first published in 1964 and re-published in 
successive editions down to the late 1990s.  Allowance must be made for the 
constraints of the single-volume overview format, but in the construction of its 
strongly Whiggish narrative Mackie underplayed the centripetal impulses that 
emanated from the cultural diversity of the hybrid and synthetic state constructed by 
the descendents of Malcolm III and overplayed the unifying role of Scottish kingship.  
Thus, the relationship of the four MacDonald Lords of the Isles with the Stewarts was 
observed through the lens of crown-magnate politics and presented as a manifestation 
of the conflict between over-mighty, self-serving nobles and a far-sighted, high-
minded monarchy that he viewed as the dominant theme in the political history of the 
later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
52
  The Lord of the Isles may have ‘exercised 
authority almost independent of that of the King,’53 but there was no question that he 
was anything other than a Scottish nobleman operating within the political sphere of 
the kingdom.  For Mackie, the early fifteenth-century struggle for Ross was a 
straightforward dispute over title and inheritance between rival members of a single 
social group, ‘misrepresented as a struggle between Highland and Lowland,’54 while 
James I’s actions against both the MacDonalds and their Albany Stewart rivals was 
one dimension of his aggressive reassertion of crown authority over the magnates.  
Thus, too, the forfeiture of Ross in 1475/6 became simply part of James III’s 
reimposition of royal power in the aftermath of the disorder of his minority,
55
 while 
the forfeiture of 1493 was a solution to the almost endemic disturbance of the north-
west Highlands and Islands that stemmed from John MacDonald’s inability to provide 
good lordship.
56
  James IV’s forceful action was the epitome of good lordship and 
strong government, while the behaviour of John, his son Angus Óg, and his nephew 
Alexander of Lochalsh, represented the antithesis of those virtues. 
    Mackie’s view of the political context for the Lordship found similar expression in 
Rosalind Mitchison’s 1970 one-volume history.  Although she highlighted its cultural 
and social distinctiveness, her discussion placed the Lordship within the wider context 
of the Scottish noble community and compared the political behaviour of the Lords to 
other Scottish – and indeed French - magnates.57  Interestingly, she focussed on the 
comparisons to be made with the Dukes of Brittany, especially the quasi-regal 
trappings with which the positions of Duke and Lord were imbued and their semi-
detached relationship with the kingdoms to which they were at least nominally 
subject.  But she also drew important distinctions: Breton dukes had a complex 
bureaucracy to support their government; the Lords of the Isles depended on personal 
influence and force to provide the ‘governing machinery’ of their principality.  This 
latter point is of crucial importance in her discussion of the John 4
th
 Lord, who was 
dismissed in terms of which Donald Gregory would have approved.  In her words, 
John ‘was not a man to drive anything through consistently’; his personal weakness 
contributed significantly to the ultimate collapse of the power of the Lordship.
58
  
Wider exploration of the fall of the Lordship, however, again emphasised the place of 
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the MacDonalds within the magnate community, their behaviour again being 
compared directly with their peer-group elsewhere in Scotland.  Mitchison concluded 
her discussion of the forfeiture of the Lordship and its aftermath with observations 
presented wholly from a central government perspective: James IV had dealt with the 
Lordship just as he would have dealt with any troublesome magnate anywhere in the 
kingdom, but in so doing he failed to recognise the role that even a weak Lord of the 
Isles had played in binding together the fractious kindreds of the Gaelic West.  For 
Mitchison, it was the demise of the Lordship at James’s hands that created the 
disorder in which ‘clan chiefs [began to come] forward and act as nearly independent 
rulers.’59  Although somewhat grudging in tone, it is also a surprisingly upbeat 
assessment of the positive contribution of the Lordship in a historical analysis that is 
resolutely focussed on ‘the making of the kingdom’. 
    These themes were explored in greater detail and with more subtlety by Ranald 
Nicholson in his 1974 contribution to the four-volume Edinburgh History of Scotland.  
His work attracted much criticism in the 1980s and 1990s for its monarchocentric 
perspective and its decidedly bleak vision of crown-magnate relations under the 
Stewart kings down to James IV, but more recently its analysis of the essentially 
negative role of the over-mighty subject in medieval Scottish political life has 
regained more widespread academic acceptance.  His treatment of the Lordship of the 
Isles is more problematical, for there are clear tensions in his exploration of the 
cultural difference between the Gaelic Highlands and Islands and the anglophone 
Lowlands which points to a unity of identity and a separation of existence, and his 
discussion of the political activities of the Lords which occurs largely within a frame 
of Scottish crown-magnate relations.  This tension was clear in Nicholson’s 
exploration of the career of John 1
st
 Lord, and the domain over which he ruled, which 
occured in a series of sections dispersed across three chapters.  When John was first 
discussed in detail it was in the context of his political opportunism, which Nicholson 
argues saw him commit to neither side in the Bruce-Balliol conflict of the 1330s.  
Although presented as operating within the frame of Scottish domestic politics, John 
was portrayed as manoeuvring adroitly as a semi-detached agent between the rival 
factions to maximise his parchment-based territorial acquisitions without being 
obliged to commit his resources militarily.
60
  Although he reached a ‘final concord’ in 
1343 which bound him to David II, his avoidance of the 1346 campaign is perhaps a 
better measure of his commitment to Bruce kingship.  John’s subsequent return to a 
policy of aggressive neutrality, where he capitalised on opportunities to enhance his 
own position without committing himself to the continuing Scottish civil war and 
Anglo-Scottish conflict, again reveals him as a free agent operating in the voids 
between the spheres of Scottish or English power.
61
  His marriage into the Stewarts 
which occurred in the midst of this period, however, was used by Nicholson in the 
first instance to illustrate John’s revival of the Hebrides-based domain of his ancestor 
Somerled, but was developed also to stress his integration into a network of strategic 
alliances that united a group of lords – the Steward, the Lord of the Isles, the Earl of 
Ross, and the heads of the MacDougall and Campbell kindreds – in what he labelled 
as ‘a sort of “Highland Party”’.62  John, in this analysis, was at once a semi-detached 
agent yet simultaneously integrated through a network of marital and political 
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alliances into one of the most powerful groupings within the mainland Scottish 
magnate community. 
    With John’s great-grandson and namesake, John 4th Lord, Nicholson’s discussion 
initially presented him as a senior Scottish nobleman – it was as the Earl of Ross that 
he was most often identified - and focused on his role in the crown-magnate conflicts 
of James II’s reign.63  Although a party to the bond which some contemporary sources 
saw as the catalyst for the king’s murder of the 8th Earl of Douglas in 1452, John 
played no part in James’s final confrontation with the Black Douglases in 1455 and 
participated, albeit through proctors, in the parliamentary process that ended the 
conflict.  Nicholson saw the king as having bought Ross’s neutrality, but both the 
bribes and the outcome were part of an unquestionably Scottish political process; 
neutral or otherwise, John was fully engaged within the Scottish political community.  
That engagement grew stronger as the reign progressed, and it was as a magnate of 
Scotland and loyal vassal of the crown that John participated in the 1460 campaign 
which ended in the king’s death at Roxburgh.64 
    Nicholson followed the traditional historiographical view in seeing a significant 
shift in the 4
th
 Lord’s political behaviour after the death of James II.  From that point, 
Nicholson believed that he was drawn into direct dealings with the English crown that 
led ultimately to treasonable treaties with Edward IV.
65
  John was, in his view, the 
active agent in this business.  His behaviour Nicholson likened to that of Charles the 
Bold, duke of Burgundy, who responded violently to the constraints brought by 
growth of a unitary French state under the Valois kings from Charles VII onwards: the 
new and aggressively assertive Scottish monarchy that James I and James II had 
established was similarly unattractive to the MacDonalds.  Nicholson, however, went 
beyond the analogy, suggesting that the cultural homogeneity of John’s domain 
offered greater potential as state-forming material than the culturally and linguistically 
diverse lands of Duke Charles.  But, although he agreed with previous assessments of 
John as ‘steeped in duplicity’ and being the ‘Celtic dirk’ with which Edward IV could 
stab Scotland in the back if he were so inclined,
66
 he stepped back from any 
suggestion that the Earl of Ross was seeking to create an independent state.  There is 
an inference, too, that John’s actions in 1460-2 were more posturing than indicative of 
real intent: certainly, by 1464 he had made no move to activate the terms of his treaty 
with Edward IV and instead negotiated with the government of the underage James III 
and made restitution for his earlier behaviour.
67
 
    Nicholson’s implied leadership failings on John’s part are voiced – but only slightly 
more clearly – in his account of the forfeiture of Ross in 1475/6.  His deficiencies, 
however, were expressed in terms of uninspiring military leadership rather than any 
deeper defect of character, and the consequences of his submission were expressed 
firstly in terms of the opening up of northern and western Scotland to Lowland 
influences rather than its impact on his personal position.
68
  Nicholson, however, went 
on to argue that the events of 1476 created fault lines within the MacDonald family, 
attributing to the surrender of Ross a decisive role in the breach between John and his 
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heir which by 1481 had seen John reduced to the status of ‘a mere protégé of the 
crown.’69  With John lacking means to express as effective lordship his titular 
headship of the kindred, rather than solving the crown’s problems in the Highlands 
the part-forfeiture of 1475/6 had instead opened a Pandora’s Box with younger and 
more hawkish members of the family seeking to assert their personal leadership.  
Nicholson’s discussion of their warlike adventures in the 1480s and early 1490s gives 
the impression of unfocussed, random violence and descent into general disorder in 
the Highlands and Islands, a situation that ‘offended the majesty of the new 
monarchy’ until eventually the exasperated king was forced into decisive action.70  
And it was, in Nicholson’s eyes, James IV who took the lead in the forfeiture of 1493 
and who continued to direct operations there.  In his final assessment it was a 
combination of Lowland cultural alienation from the Highlanders, weak or divided 
leadership, but above all the incompatibility of a semi-independent principality with 
the ambitions of a unitary monarchy and that monarchy’s violent intrusion of its 
authority into MacDonald territory that precipitated the fall of the Lordship. 
    Nicholson’s vision of later medieval Scotland and of the place of the Lordship 
within it has displayed remarkable historiographical stamina and its legacy is writ 
large in a broad raft of more recent works.  Only three years after the first publication 
of his work, however, an alternative view of the Lordship which presented it in a far 
more positive light appeared in print.  Like Nicholson’s account, this text has proven 
to have enduring influence over more recent scholars and is claimed by some to be the 
most authoritative analysis of the Lordship to date.  Published as an appendix to the 
Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland’s Late 
Medieval Monumental Sculpture in the West Highlands, John Bannerman’s twelve-
page essay was intended only to provide background to the monument-specific 
historical discussion offered in the main body of the volume.
71
  It offers neither a 
comprehensive chronological overview of the MacDonald Lordship nor any 
developed discussion of the internal dynamics which contributed to its demise but it 
does articulate clearly the lineal development of a West Highland and Hebridean 
power-bloc from the last days of Dalriada in the ninth century, through the Kingdom 
of the Isles and the realm constructed by Somerled in the twelfth century, to the later 
medieval Lordship of Somerled’s heirs.  This political narrative is balanced by a 
second strand in which Bannerman focused on the cultural unity of the territories 
under MacDonald domination in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries and 
emphasised how their all-embracing political leadership of the Scottish Gaidhealtachd 
provided the stimulus for an efflorescence of a distinctive Gaelic tradition in the arts.  
The failure of the Lordship, although not paralleled by an immediate failure of the 
Gaelic artistic tradition, signalled the end of what proved with hindsight to have been 
a Golden Age of cultural achievement. 
    Within his discussion, Bannerman highlighted several factors that he saw as having 
contributed to the establishment of MacDonald dominance and to the particular 
character of their Lordship.  He identified in particular the fissiparous tendencies of 
the kin-based societies of Ireland and Scotland and the resulting alternation in the 
headship of the kindred between different branches through processes that were not 
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always peaceful.
72
  His belief in some kind of rotating headship of the kin, reflected in 
the title Rí Innse Gall (King of the Islands of the Foreigners) held by the 
acknowledged head, with a subordinate title of Rí Airir Goídel (King of 
Argyll/Coastland of the Gael) held by another kin-member, may not be favoured by 
more recent scholars, but his portrayal of competition between the descendents of 
Somerled for primacy is widely accepted. 
    Following the established historiographical tradition, Bannerman saw the main 
branches of Somerled’s descendents as developing their powerbase in the interstices 
between the territories which recognised the overlordship of either the kings of 
Norway (in the Hebrides) or the kings of Scots (on the mainland).  This position, he 
argued, permitted these families to operate as independent agents who paid lip-service 
to their nominal overlords.  It is not explained how or why, but Bannerman suggested 
that it was this degree of political independence that perhaps led to them being ‘more 
wholly committed to a purely Gaelic society and culture than the rest of Scotland.’73  
Nevertheless, as Scottish political influence increased in the thirteenth century and 
their overlordship of the Isles was confirmed by treaty in 1266, Bannerman conceded 
that the Gaelic character of their territories, particularly its cultural and social system, 
began ‘to exhibit certain features which derived from a closer contact with East 
Scotland’.  Somerled’s own Scandinavian heritage was casually overlooked in this 
analysis and the vision of the Western Isles in particular as a zone of uniformly Gaelic 
culture from the twelfth to fifteenth centuries was accepted de facto.  The historical 
conditions for the extension of Clan Donald lordship over all this zone of common 
Gaelic culture were projected back into the period from the ninth to thirteenth 
centuries; the MacDonald Lordship was, it seems, historically preordained. 
    Bannerman’s inclination to translate cultural zones into political entities led him to 
make similar propositions for the extent of MacDonald lordship on the mainland.  
Basing his view on the genealogical sections within the document known prosaically 
as MS 1467, he proposed that the compiler of that document had intended the list of 
clan chiefs which he had constructed to be understood as comprising those who, in his 
opinion, acknowledged MacDonald overlordship.
74
  In addition to the clans who 
occupied the Hebrides, Ross and Lochaber, the compiler of the manuscript named all 
of the leading mid and north Argyll clans – headed by the Campbells and the 
MacDougalls – and those occupying the territory which would later be labelled 
Breadalbane, principally the MacGregors, MacNabs and MacLarens, spread from 
Glenstrae in the west to Balquhidder in the east.  The circumstances for this eastward 
expansion of MacDonald influence, Bannerman proposed, was the collapse of the 
traditional Gaelic kin-based power-structure within much of this region consequent on 
the forfeiture in the early fourteenth century of what he saw as the ‘Celtic earldom of 
Atholl’.75  Again, more recent scholarship calls into question the extent to which 
Breadalbane fell under the political leadership of Atholl before the fourteenth century 
and it is also questionable to what degree the Strathbogie earls of Atholl could be 
regarded as ‘Celtic’ by c.1300.  Instead, Balquhidder, Glen Dochart, Glen Lyon, the 
lands bordering Loch Tay, and the district of Rannoch, appear to have been a series of 
discrete lordships over much of which Stewart control was being established from the 
1360s.
76
  Bannerman recognised that the eastward reach of the MacDonalds may have 
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been transitory or reflected more in terms of cultural leadership than political 
overlordship, but he did see that leadership as enduring into at least the mid-sixteenth 
century.
77
  This view he based on the contents of the Book of the Dean of Lismore, 
compiled by the brothers James and Duncan MacGregor, the first of whom was vicar 
of Fortingall in Glen Lyon and dean of Argyll, based at Lismore.  Compiled in 
Breadalbane and containing poems composed in the ‘narrow corridor extending as far 
as Loch Awe’, then opening out to include one in praise of MacLeod of Lewis at one 
geographical extreme and MacNeill of Gigha at the other, it was in Bannerman’s view 
only in the context of the Lordship of the Isles that this spread can be understood.  
Given the extension of Campbell power within the mainland component of this zone 
before the end of the fifteenth century, however, it must be questioned how real even 
a memory of the cultural leadership of the Lordship was amongst anyone other than 
the Gaelic intelligentsia. 
    There is less controversy in Bannerman’s analysis of the fall of the Lordship.  He 
identified two main issues that created tensions which contributed to the failure of 
John 4
th
 Lord and the collapse of MacDonald power.  One is widely acknowledged by 
all those who have worked on the history of the Lordship: the MacDonalds’ ‘penchant 
for treating with the kings of England’.78  The other, however, is significantly more 
insightful; their attempts to consolidate their authority in Ross.  The importance of the 
earldom to the MacDonalds had been recognised by all scholars since Tytler but the 
view generally had been that control of Ross had been secure from the outset, founded 
on the support within the earldom and its kin networks gained through Donald’s 
marriage to Mary Leslie.  Bannerman recognised the early success of the MacDonalds 
in winning support amongst leading Ross kindreds like the Mackenzies but 
highlighted also how longer term their possession of the earldom came to depend on 
their military presence and strength at any given time.
79
  This general comment has 
been developed upon substantially by more recent scholars (as discussed below) but it 
was Bannerman who first highlighted the shallowness of support for the MacDonalds 
within the earldom.  He pointed to the absence of any substantial kin network around 
the Leslies, who had themselves been intruded into Ross in the late 1360s, contrasting 
this situation with the network which marriage to Amy MacRuairi had brought for 
John 1
st
 Lord and which gave their son a powerbase as head of what became the 
Clanranald MacDonalds.  In Ross, the MacDonalds were confronted by the already 
alienated Ross kindred who had been separated from the comital title through the 
forced intrusion of the Leslies by King David II.  The second factor arose directly 
from this lack of embedded kin network, for the only means of delivering domination 
was a military solution which exacerbated rather than helped to resolve the alienation 
of the established regional kindreds.  Forcible intrusion of members of the 
MacDonald kindred or their main vassal families was only viable where a sustained 
effort could be mounted, and it emerged that the Lord of the Isles had neither the 
resources nor the time to commit to any sustained or systematic programme of 
military domination and settlement in Ross.  The intermittent efforts of the 
MacDonalds to consolidate their grip on Ross therefore served only to sharpen 
opposition to them and undermine their authority there, weaknesses that were exposed 
to devastating effect after 1475.  MacDonald efforts to recover possession in the 
1480s and 1490s divided the kindred and diverted energy from consolidating its 
control over what remained of the Lordship, while at the same time entrenching 
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opposition locally within Ross and confirming in crown eyes the dangerous 
unpredictability of the kindred and its role as a disturber of the peace of the realm.  In 
Bannerman’s final assessment, it was these political factors rather than any fear of the 
Lordship’s status as the Gaelic ‘Other’ within Scotland that sealed its fate. 
    It was this contribution of the earldom of Ross to the fall of John MacDonald, as 
outlined by Bannerman, that was taken up by Norman MacDougall in his 1982 James 
III: a Political Study.
80
  He identified a feud in the north between John and George 
Gordon, earl of Huntly, as a critical factor in the increasing level of disturbance 
centred on Ross and in encouraging the king to take decisive action, adding to the 
traditional case based on John’s treasonable dealings with England and his illegal 
seizures of crown revenues in Inverness and Moray.
81
  Equally critical in his view, 
however, was the tension within the MacDonald family that Nicholson had earlier 
highlighted but with greater importance being placed on the ineffectiveness of John 
MacDonald as head of kin.  MacDougall conceded that John’s position was 
impossible but that he worsened it by indecision and inaction as, in MacDougall’s 
words, he ‘dithered from one alliance to the next in an unsuccessful attempt to prove 
himself an effective clan leader and Crown servant at one and the same time.’82  It 
was a theme that recurred with increasing emphasis in subsequent analyses over the 
next two decades. 
    In its strikingly negative portrayal of James III and of crown-magnate relations in 
later fifteenth-century Scotland, MacDougall was working very much in the 
Nicholson tradition.  By the early 1980s, however, an alternative school of thought 
had emerged that was articulating alternative visions of the nature of later medieval 
Scotland’s political community.  The most forceful reaction against Nicholson’s 
dystopian view of crown-magnate relations emerged in the late 1970s in the work of 
the young scholars of what has come to be termed ‘the new orthodoxy’, represented 
principally by Jenny Brown or Wormald and Alexander Grant.  The most significant 
of these in terms of understanding of the Lordship was Grant’s alternative view of its 
place in Scottish history.  Developing from an initial reappraisal of the relations 
between John 4
th
 Lord and James, 9
th
 earl of Douglas published in 1981,
83
 his 
revisionist interpretation received its first fully-developed articulation in his 
contribution to the New History of Scotland series, which was under the general 
editorship of Jenny Wormald.  Published in 1984, Independence and Nationhood: 
Scotland 1306-1469 and the series in general took a thematic approach which 
although not entirely eschewing traditional chronological narratives was less overtly 
teleological and made a conscious effort to move away from the ‘great man’ and 
‘state-builder’ traditions of previous generations.84  This trend was evident in 
everything from the non-traditional date-range of the volume – from Robert Bruce’s 
seizure of the Scottish throne to the end of the minority of James III – to the 
avoidance of reign-based chapters and exploration of broad themes, such as Highlands 
and Lowlands.  While revisionist in perspective, Grant’s re-evaluation of Highland-
Lowland relations and, within that, of Stewart-MacDonald relations was neither 
apologetic nor eulogistic in tone.  Cultural difference mattered: the Lordship was ‘a 
self-consciously and even aggressively Gaelic institution,’ whose actions on occasion 
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could be regarded as threatening by the Lowlands-based government.
85
  
Expansionism, as displayed by the Lords of the Isles, was a cultural condition that 
sprang from the kin-based structures of Gaelic society; it was not a manifestation of 
some primordial antipathy between rival cultures.  A second significant departure 
from traditional histories in Grant’s new analysis was his shifting of the focus away 
from the vision of the Stewart-MacDonald relationship as a bipolar conflict between 
two power-blocs that represented opposed cultural and political halves of Scotland.  
The key to understanding why those two parties came into collision, he argued, was to 
recognise the significance of the disintegration of the lordship structures and kin-
networks that had been established in the central Highland region down to the Wars of 
Independence.
86
  It was the collapse of the old regime in Moray, he believed, that 
brought the ‘essentially peripheral’ Lordship into collision with their equally 
essentially peripheral Stewart kinsmen as both manoeuvred opportunistically for 
maximum advantage in a reconfigured political landscape. 
    In his closer examination of the MacDonald Lordship, Grant’s analysis made a 
series of shifts from traditional perspectives.  One of the most important of these was 
to question the notion of the Lordship as a monolithic block whose uniting identity 
was provided by a shared culture that was thoroughly Gaelic and kin-based in 
character.  Whilst acknowledging the strengths of Bannerman’s presentation of the 
growth of MacDonald power as ‘a manifestation of the natural fluctuations within 
kin-based society,’ he challenged the notion of the Lords as culturally conservative 
kin-based chieftains who held innovation and alien traditions at bay.
87
  Most 
significant in his eyes was John 1
st
 Lord’s use of ‘feudal’ legal mechanisms to extend 
and consolidate his power and, by extension, to fix control of his enlarged dominion 
in the hands of his son and grandson, removing the possibility of descent to collaterals 
within his wider kin.  Authority over them and over the greater landowners within the 
Lordship, moreover, was founded on feudal relationships defined by charters.  In 
essence, Grant was stressing the similarity of power-relationships forged within their 
Lordship by the MacDonalds and those employed by crown and magnates elsewhere 
within the kingdom.
88
 
    Here, however, Grant drew a line: cultural difference might not have truly 
distinguished the Lords’ political lordship from that of their peers elsewhere in 
Scotland but in other aspects of their social behaviour it was of prime significance.  
Self-conscious projection of their place at the head of Gaelic society, a role 
wholeheartedly endorsed by Gaelic poets and craftsmen in their work, masked much 
of the cultural similarity between the MacDonalds and other Scottish lords.  Strident 
assertion of cultural dissimilarity, perhaps especially the glorification of the violent 
projection of the virile qualities of Gaelic lordship, might indeed have heightened the 
sense of difference between Highland and Lowland peoples.
89
  That difference, too, 
was sharpened by the manner in which their expansion was effected: exertion of 
military pressure; imposition of de facto superiority; extraction of resources; and 
establishment of lasting possession (often with belated formal government 
ratification). 
    Closely linked with this militarised projection of lordship in entrenching cultural 
difference and a detachment from Lowland Scottish political society that was more 
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than simply perceptual was, in Grant’s view, the fundamental relationship of the 
Lords with the Scottish crown.  For him, this position stemmed from an absence of a 
‘feudal settlement’ between the Scottish crown and the MacDonalds in the manner 
that it had occurred for their former west-coast rivals the MacDougalls.
90
  This is not 
the place to question the premise upon which that view was founded, for the research 
that suggests that there was a closer relationship between the crown and the 
MacDonalds in the thirteenth century was not available when Grant was writing.  
What is more important is to recognise the significance of what he saw as the 
underlying motivation that drew MacDonalds into what were essentially marriages of 
convenience with the Bruces and then the Stewarts; that timeless flawed aphorism of 
‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend.’  The Bruce-MacDonald alliance had deeper roots 
than their shared hostility to the MacDougalls, but MacDonald-Stewart alignment 
may well have arisen from their mutual rivalry with the Randolphs in the central and 
west Highlands.  A common rival, however, did not mean common ambitions and, 
rather than any commitment to the Bruce-Stewart kingship MacDonald association 
with those families was predicated principally on opportunities for territorial 
aggrandisement.  The result was semi-detachment from mainstream Scottish political 
agendas that was only managed by the crown through either forceful imposition of 
royal sovereignty which brought reluctant – and usually temporary - submission or 
laissez-faire policies aimed at securing co-operation that were successful for only so 
long as they were to MacDonald advantage.
91
 
    With perhaps too much of a teleological eye to the final denouement of Stewart-
MacDonald relations in the 1490s, Grant’s discussion of the Lordship concluded with 
an appraisal of the situation prevailing after 1431.  Contrary to traditional 
presentations of 1411 and the battle of Harlaw as the turning-point in Highland 
history he saw 1431 and Inverlochy as the key moment.  Grant argued that the 
Inverlochy campaign revealed to the Lowlands-based government that the western 
Highlands were probably even more of a problem without a Lord of the Isles than 
with him.  James I, he believed, either abandoned any conscious effort to impose his 
authority over the region or accepted that only Alexander MacDonald had the ability 
to do so.  The consequence of this change in policy was acknowledgement of 
MacDonald claims to Ross, possession of which combined with the disappearance of 
the alternative focal points of regional lordship in the Stewart earldom of Mar and the 
Dunbar earldom of Moray elevated the MacDonalds to unquestioned regional pre-
eminence.  The result, however, Grant saw as a possible relocation of the centre of 
political gravity within the MacDonald territories, with Ross taking central 
importance, and the emergence of Alexander, as Earl of Ross, as a pivotal figure in 
the government of the North.  Indeed, Alexander’s subsequent career could be 
presented as that of a fairly conventional Scottish magnate.  Grant’s final observation, 
however, was that regardless of Alexander’s personal behaviour the moment for 
smooth assimilation of the MacDonalds and their domain within the rest of the 
kingdom was long past.
92
 
    Of all the material on the Lordship published in the 1980s the most substantial was 
the edition of the acts of the Lords of the Isles by Jean and William Munro.
93
  While 
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the charters and other acts contained in that volume constitute one of the most 
valuable collections of edited sources for Clan Donald lordship between 1336 and 
1493, the introduction and appendices to them provide an equally rich resource for 
scholars.  Here for the first time was set out not just a narrative discussion of the 
Lords and their political relationships, but also comprehensive genealogical 
information, detailed analysis of their landholding, discussion of their government and 
administration, relations with the Church in the Isles, and diplomatic dealings with 
regional, national and international neighbours.  With around half of their volume’s 
321 pages of text devoted to these discursive sections, although produced as an 
edition of the surviving parchment record for the Lordship, the Acts of the Lords of 
the Isles was the most comprehensive historical analysis yet produced on the subject.  
It was, however, a fairly conservative analysis and, with their avowedly insular 
perspective,
94
 avoided anything beyond presentation of a synthesis of the then-current 
discussion revolving around the Lords’ political activities on the mainland.  But this is 
also part of its great value, for their general objectivity and the dispassionate tone of 
their discussion avoided the partisanship of previous commentators while nevertheless 
imprinting a strongly positive impression of the Lords and their achievements on their 
audience.  Most importantly, however, the Munros had produced a tool of immense 
value to scholars which drew together in one gathering the surviving record evidence 
for the Lords and for their relationship with their vassals in both their Hebridean and 
mainland domain.  In so doing, they set a new baseline for analysis and enabled the 
next generation of scholars to embark upon a rigorous reappraisal of the place of the 
MacDonalds and their Lordship in the medieval kingdom. 
    The generally positive assessments of Grant and the Munros and the portrayal of 
cultural Golden Age as presented by Bannerman were drawn together in the new 
historiography of the late 1980s and early 1990s in what seems like a rehabilitation or 
vindication of the MacDonalds.  The synthesis offered by Michael Lynch in his 1991 
single-volume history reflects the scale of the shift that had occurred in the historical 
mainstream perspective since the 1970s.  From the Nicholson, Bannerman and Grant 
discussions, Lynch took the cultural distinctiveness of the Lordship, in which the 
MacDonalds ‘fostered a renewed, self-conscious pan-Celtic Gaeldom’, and the peace 
and stability which their rule restored to a region that had suffered political 
disintegration during the long years of Balliol-Bruce conflict after 1296.
95
  The focus 
in the discussion is on the manner in which the notion of a ‘Highland problem’ was 
manufactured in the minds of Lowlanders, exacerbated by a Lowland tendency to 
increasingly label themselves as ‘Scots’ while the Highlanders were distinguished as 
‘Irish’.  Lynch opposed this to the view in the Gaidhealtachd which on the one hand 
was built around a notion of a ‘pan-Celtic Gaeldom’ encompassing Ireland and the 
north and west of Scotland, while on the other it preserved an allegiance to both the 
idea of ‘Scotland’ and to the person of the king of Scots.96  Lynch chose to illustrate 
this opposition between Lowland fear of an increasingly culturally alien Highlands 
and the Highland view of their intrinsic Scottishness with the example of Alexander 
Stewart, the ‘Wolf of Badenoch’, the third son of King Robert II and politically-
ambitious for a role in the government of the kingdom but also a leader of Highland 
caterans and a man who had adopted many of the cultural traits of Gaelic kin-based 
society.  His intrusion into the Highlands, Lynch argued, was just one manifestation 
of a long tradition of Lowland disruption of Highland society that culminated in 
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James IV’s ‘attempted eclipse’ of the Lordship in 1493.97  This quiet reversal of over 
a century of Lowland-centred Scottish historiography, however, was simply slipped 
into the discussion and left hanging. 
    In general, Lynch otherwise wove his account of the rise and fall of the 
MacDonalds into his narrative in a fairly conventional manner, following the main 
themes that had been set out by Nicholson, Bannerman and Munro in their overviews.  
On the demise of the Lordship in the years after 1475/6, however, he developed on 
the point first made by Bannerman concerning the tenuousness of the MacDonald 
hold over Ross, and MacDougall’s highlighting of the earldom as the main source of 
conflict for the family in the 1480s and 1490s, referring to it as ‘the Achilles’ heel’ 
which helped the crown to break the power of the family.
98
  James III’s restoration of 
John MacDonald to his island territories in 1476 and creation as a Lord of Parliament 
in 1478 he presented as an attempt to integrate the semi-detached Gaelic districts of 
Scotland more fully into the realm under crown authority in a manner that he 
suggested anticipated the sixteenth-century Tudor policy of surrender and regrant in 
respect of Gaelic Irish chieftains.  The effort, however, he concluded was a failure, for 
he saw Clan Donald power in the Isles as ‘barely touched’ by crown or parliamentary 
action and it was ultimately divisions within the kindred that pitched John against first 
his son and then his nephew in a series of bids to regain Ross that drove the crown 
finally to intervene again in 1493.
99
 
    Lynch’s conclusions on the causes and consequences of the fall of the Lordship 
between 1475/6 and 1493 reveal several tensions in the historiography as he sought to 
reconcile the traditionally negative vision of mainstream Lowland convention with the 
more up-beat tone of Bannerman and Grant.  As an overview, he was also unable to 
develop his discussion in depth on most of the issues that he presented as central in 
the debates over the Lordship’s demise.  It also meant that he was unable to explore 
less widely-accepted arguments, notably that voiced by Bannerman in the 1970s, 
when he had raised important questions over the stability of the Lordship from the 
1430s onwards, particularly with regard to what could be regarded as a manifestation 
of ‘imperial overstretch’ in Alexander 3rd Lord’s acquisition of Ross.  Lynch accepted 
the general view that Ross was a source of instability within the MacDonald domain, 
but for Bannerman it was more like a lethal drug.   He saw MacDonald inability to 
commit the resources necessary to convert titular lordship over the earldom into 
secure possession yet reluctance to concede that inability and achieve some form of 
rapprochement with the regional kindreds who held real power locally as fatally 
weakening the Lordship under Alexander’s son, John.  It was an intriguing 
proposition but, other than give a nod to it in their overarching narratives, no scholar 
had sought to test the thesis until 2000, when Norman MacDougall published his 
analysis of what he labelled, using Lynch’s term, the Lordship’s ‘Achilles’ Heel’.100  
In that paper, MacDougall developed on an idea he had advanced in outline in 1982 
and presented a detailed critique of the political collapse of MacDonald fortunes from 
its apogee under Alexander – ‘easily the greatest magnate in the entire Highlands’101 – 
to the dissolution of the Lordship under John and his would-be successors. 
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    Starting with an assessment of the young John MacDonald’s inheritance in 1449, 
MacDougall broadly accepted Grant’s argument that beneath the superficial veneer of 
territorial supremacy within the Highlands and Islands reinforced by possession of 
key offices and titles MacDonald power was remarkably fragile and that along with 
all the lands and status John had also inherited over two generations of Crown-
MacDonald hostility.
102
  It is MacDougall’s view that it was recognition of that 
fragility rather than any sense of unassailable strength that led John and his advisers to 
negotiate his marriage to Elizabeth Livingstone, daughter of the man who controlled 
the adolescent King James II and effectively ran the court.  Through her, the 
MacDonalds might have hoped for an improvement in their relations with the 
crown.
103
  Unfortunately for John, within weeks of his marriage, Livingstone was 
toppled from power as the young king asserted his authority.  MacDougall’s 
discussion of MacDonald reaction to these events still follows Grant’s analysis but his 
exploration of the king’s response to the 1451 MacDonald rebellion opens a new 
avenue; the origins of MacDonald-Gordon rivalry.
104
  Rather than the king deploying 
the 1
st
 Earl of Huntly against John MacDonald in 1451, MacDougall argued that he 
was simply giving a formal ‘nod of approval’ to Gordon actions in a conflict for 
control of the central Highlands that dated back to at least 1431 and which played out 
in Gordon action as royal agents following the forfeiture of Ross in 1475.
105
  In what 
may have amounted to recognition that ‘my enemy’s enemy is my friend’, the king 
appears to have been willing to concede control of land, royal castles and titles in 
Badenoch to the Gordons to use them as a barrier to MacDonald expansion into the 
same district.  The principal motive on John MacDonald’s part in the political 
conflicts first between James II and the Livingstones and then between the king and 
the Douglases, MacDougall argues, was an effort to consolidate his hold on Ross.  
The attempted expansion in the Great Glen and Badenoch areas was designed to 
protect his position in the earldom and his regular presence at Dingwall and Inverness 
rather than in the Hebridean heartlands of the Lordship indicating that the earldom 
was his primary concern at this time.  That James II was in no position to eject John 
from his gains in the 1450s leads him to conclude that the young 4
th
 Lord must at this 
stage be considered a success.
106
 
    At this point in the argument, however, MacDougall turns John’s focus on Ross 
from a positive into a negative.  Raising first the question of the degree to which his 
and his father’s diversion of their main efforts towards controlling their earldom led to 
a waning of their personal authority within their ancestral heartlands – where local 
chieftains looked to alternative figures within the wider MacDonald kindred to 
provide dynamic leadership – he proposes that the assumption of that leadership role 
by his kinsmen resulted in the longer term in a deterioration in crown-MacDonald 
relations.  With John expending his energies on Ross, his cousin Donald Balloch, lord 
of Dunyvaig on Islay and the Glens of Antrim in Ulster, was left to pursue an 
aggressive course in support of the Douglases, mounting a destructive raid on Stewart 
interests around the Firth of Clyde in 1454.  Donald continued to direct MacDonald 
policy in the Isles and in 1461-2 it was he who in MacDougall’s view provided the 
driving force behind the negotiations that led to the so-called treaty of Westminster-
Ardtornish with Edward IV of England.  Through this period and down to the early 
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1470s, while Donald Balloch and his immediate family provided leadership in the 
Lordship proper, John was found almost entirely in Ross and Inverness, seeking to 
consolidate or extend his problematical heritage in the north-east.  MacDougall posits 
the question that the MacDonalds by the 1460s were already a ‘house divided’ with 
Donald Balloch and his immediate kin challenging the position of John.
107
  Through 
his focus on Ross, John had effectively yielded primacy in the Lordship proper to his 
more hawkish kinsman.  He thereby created what MacDougall described as his 
Achilles’ Heel, for despite John’s efforts the MacDonalds’ hold on Ross remained 
tenuous and the loss of the earldom threw him back onto the portion of his heritage in 
which he had neglected to maintain his personal authority. 
    It is MacDougall’s contention that the settlement of 1476 by which John was 
received back into the king’s peace and confirmed in possession of his ancestral lands 
in the Hebrides ‘amounted to the real forfeiture of the Lordship of the Isles’.108  His 
authority fatally undermined by his failure to resist James III’s seizure of Ross and 
with his own kinsmen – including his designated heir, his illegitimate son Angus Óg – 
jostling for the social and political leadership of the whole MacDonald kindred, John 
became an almost powerless onlooker in the continuing dismemberment of his 
heritage.  Even now Ross continued in MacDougall’s view to be the source of 
continued MacDonald weakness and division, and the cause of further conflict with 
the crown as first Angus sought to recover the earldom through military action in the 
late 1480s, then following his assassination in 1489 his cousin Alexander of Lochalsh 
pursued a similar course.  Through all of these events, John dithered in the 
background, vacillating between support for his nephew Alexander – who seems to 
have secured recognition from most of the chieftains as head of the kindred – and 
making gestures of loyalty towards the king.  Such indecision and incapacity to 
provide strong leadership, MacDougall argues, convinced the men who controlled the 
government of the underage James IV that a full-scale intervention in the West was 
necessary, a course of action also urged by the leading crown loyalists in the Isles.
109
  
The resulting forfeiture of 1493 was not, however, the decision of the energetic, 
teenage king as which it has so often been presented, for be did not take control of his 
own government for a further two years.  Instead, MacDougall argues, it was the 
decision of his chancellor, the political maverick Archibald Douglas, 5
th
 earl of 
Angus, who had succeeded in excluding temporarily the Campbells from any 
influence in government and who was intent on building up his own family’s position 
and that of his Boyd allies in the Clyde estuary region at the expense of the Campbells 
and their associates.  Forfeiture of John MacDonald gave Angus the device through 
which to advance that aim but, while the young James IV might have enthusiastically 
embraced his chancellor’s scheme, in MacDougall’s final analysis the king was as 
active an agent in promoting the decision as John had been in maintaining his own 
position.
110
 
    It is this last point that represents MacDougall’s most significant departure from the 
traditional historiography.  The reason for the collapse of the MacDonald empire, he 
argues, was that it had become too large to be controlled by any one individual, not 
because of the hostility of a succession of Stewart monarchs, and that its dissolution 
was accelerated by the succession of John MacDonald in 1449.  He was, in most 
assessments, a ‘minor who grew up into a weak man’, incapable of asserting his 
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headship over more aggressive members of his own family or of providing strong 
leadership against the hostile actions of powerful predatory neighbours like the 
Gordons.
111
  Rather than 1493 representing the final step in a long Crown-MacDonald 
conflict, it was but a further twist in a still-unfolding conflict between magnate rivals 
for regional supremacy. 
    Historiographical fashion in the early 2000s has seen a move away from traditional 
teleological and primarily political narratives to more thematic explorations of 
Scotland’s people and culture.  ‘Great men’ histories punctuated with battles and 
feuds had little place in the modern, post-Devolution Scotland in which this new work 
was being produced.  In the first of the early twenty-first-century overview histories 
of the nation, The New Penguin History of Scotland from the Earliest Times to the 
Present Day, the Lordship received little mention in either its discussion of later 
medieval national and regional identities or of crown-magnate relations.
112
 In a 
volume whose editors were acutely aware of how certain aspects of Scottish history – 
and also myth - have been central to the forming of national identity while others have 
been for various reasons omitted, there is some irony in the manner in which the 
historical perception of cultural difference in medieval Scotland is treated.
113
   
    More recently, discussion of the historical context for the (re-)emergence of the 
Lordship as a major power in the fourteenth century has returned to the focus on its 
place in the wider political development of the Scottish kingdom that had largely 
characterised the historiography of the 1960s and 1970s.  Michael Brown’s 
exploration of the rise of the MacDonalds between 1286 and the 1350s works on the 
premise that the rivals for power in the west Highlands and Islands were magnates 
within the realm, albeit ones whose territories had ‘retained their own traditions and 
identities’ and who regarded themselves as heirs to a kingship rather than simply lords 
under the suzerainty of a higher authority.
114
  There are echoes of an older 
historiographical tradition in his vision of the Lords of the Isles moving in the 
interstices between the power blocs of the English and Scottish crowns and 
capitalising on the latitude for independent action which that position gave.  He 
makes, however, an important distinction; that the Islesmen were not simply reacting 
to the countervailing impulses of Anglo-Scottish policies but were the most active 
agents in the reconfiguration of the region’s political structures.  For Brown, the 
critical point of departure came with the death of Alexander III.  His personal 
investment in extending his lordship over the Isles had begun the process of 
integrating the political structures of the region into his kingdom, a process that was 
advanced further through the social and political bonds forged between mainland 
Scottish nobles and their west Highland and Hebridean counterparts.  The impetus 
towards integration, however, stalled after the king’s death and the events of the next 
generation revealed how shallowly-rooted the bonds between the Scottish political 
community and the Hebridean magnates were. 
    Whilst Brown’s presentation of the position of the Lordship of the Isles vis à vis the 
Scottish kingdom offers many new insights on its political development and cultural 
base it is in many ways still a very traditional discussion that juxtaposes two 
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essentially different cultures.  By the time of its publication, other scholars were 
offering a subtly different analysis which reflected not just new scholarship but a 
changing dynamic within modern Scotland and the British Isles more generally.  
Perhaps the most significant of these new works was Simon Kingston’s exploration of 
Ulster and the Isles in the Fifteenth Century, which sought to explain the power of the 
MacDonalds in terms of a cultural/political continuum that extended from the Isles 
into the Irish mainland.
115
  Although perhaps not quite as revolutionary in its 
methodology as its author claimed, it nevertheless represented the extension into the 
world of the Gaelic west of the methodologies of the New British History and, more 
particularly, of its non-Anglocentric dimension.  Its importance was compounded by 
the stress that Kingston places on the need to examine MacDonald power across the 
theoretical political Anglo-Scottish or Scoto-Irish division that has been the traditional 
approach to histories of the Lordship and its place amongst the polities occupying the 
British Isles in the later Middle Ages.  It is a sobering reflection on the nature of 
Scottish historiography from either a Highland or a Lowland perspective that 
Kingston’s work was the first large-scale study to break out of a hermetically-sealed 
Scotland-centred bubble to analyse the ebbs and flows of the political power-play 
across the North Channel.  This approach was made possible by a shift from a focus 
centred on the political entities that were the MacDonald lordships in the Isles and 
Antrim to the individuals who controlled these territories.  From that perspective, 
individuals like John Mor, Donald Balloch and Alasdair Carrach cease to be men with 
only an episodic interest in the Scottish political scene to become figures of 
international significance whose periodic appearance and disappearance from the 
affairs of the Isles reflected their participation in greater games that demanded their 
personal presence.  The cultural context for their activities and the mentalities 
surrounding lordship and the exercise of power arising from that cultural context form 
a vital part of Kingston’s exploration of the shifting balances within the MacDonald 
lordship.  In his exploration of tigearnais and the responsibilities and perquisites of 
lordship represented within that shifting concept in the fifteenth century, Kingston 
provides a cogent thesis which explains the changing balances of power within the 
Clan Donald domain between the descendants of John I. 
    Just as Kingston was arguing for closer integration of the Ulster and Hebridean 
world in a greater Gaelic cultural and political zone, so Wilson McLeod was 
producing a reappraisal of the evidence for a single Gaelic cultural province that 
bestrode the North Channel.
116
  Redolent with the language of core-periphery 
relations (with Ireland as the core and the Scottish Gaidhealtachd as periphery) and of 
cultural collision and estrangement (between the Scottish Gaidhealtachd and what he 
terms the Galldachd of Anglophone Lowland Scotland), McLeod’s analysis has 
echoes on a grand scale of Bannerman’s 1970s exploration of the Gaelic cultural 
province within Scotland.  Like Bannerman’s earlier work, the focus is on the world 
constructed in the often introspective vision of the Gaelic intellectual elite – a 
veritable Gaidhealtachd of the mind – whose construction established boundaries that 
were perhaps far removed from the realities of either the mass of ordinary inhabitants 
of the Gaelic-speaking territories or of their social and political leaders who moved 
relatively easily between cultures. 
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    The sudden efflorescence of new histories of Scotland that appeared in the early 
years after the Millennium was not simply a marking of that chronological milestone; 
it betokened the first appearance of a new historiography for the post-1997 political 
prescription and the conscious projection of a single national identity that arose from 
that.  Christopher Harvie’s 2002 Scotland: A Short History, almost expunged all 
reference to the Highland-Lowland divide of the traditional literature.  Reference to 
the Lords of the Isles was limited to an observation on the jurisdictional powers of the 
Scottish nobility in general which he illustrated with the MacDonalds’ use of such 
jurisdiction to conduct themselves in the fifteenth century ‘almost as sovereigns.’117  
In Murray Pittock’s 2003 A New History of Scotland, the deconstruction of the 
nineteenth-century vision of the opposition of a Germanic Lowland culture and a 
Celtic Highland one exposed to a non-academic readership the manner in which that 
thesis had been used as building-block of Unionism.
118
  Pittock’s brief overview of 
medieval Scottish culture emphasised its hybridity and the central place that the 
Gaelic element within it held in the minds of the Lowland intellectual elite despite 
what he acknowledged was a growing ‘anti-Highland prejudice’ from the later 
fourteenth century.  His interpretation is a masterpiece in the new emphasis on 
cultural accommodation and inclusiveness that has become a hallmark of political and 
social consensus in post-Devolution Scotland.  Instead of the traditional catalogue of 
conflicts, he concentrates on stressing the centrality of the Gaidhealtachd to learned 
understanding of Scottish identity right up to the eighteenth century, rather than on the 
estrangement of Gaelic and Lowland cultures that occurred on a more popular 
level.
119
  In the climate of ‘One Scotland: Many Cultures’ in which Pittock was 
writing, as a device of almost limitless potential for alternative explanations of 
cultural difference or political power relationships at a national level, the Lordship of 
the Isles has found a new appeal.  After almost two centuries of historiographical 
evolution, the vision of polar opposites that Tytler and his successors had presented in 
terms of racially-based incompatibilities and mutually incomprehensible cultures had 
transmogrified from vice to virtue; diversity, difference and social or political 
pluralism as manifested in the medieval Lordship and its relationship with the rest of 
Scotland has become a lens through which to view the modern nation’s condition. 
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